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Abstract
Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed
but biased experts. In our model the decision maker’s choice problem is binary and her
preferred option depends on the state of the world unknown to her. The expert observes
the state and sends a report to the decision maker. His bias is such that he prefers the
same decision for all states. Lying about the state leads to a cost that increases in the
size of the lie. As a function of the size of the expert’s bias and the decision maker’s
prior about the underlying state, three kinds of equilibrium behavior occur. In each case
equilibrium consists of separating and pooling segments, and the decision maker takes the
expert’s preferred decision for some states for which she would not take this decision had
she observed the state herself. The model has a variety of applications and extends to
situations in which the decision maker may be naive and take the report by its face value,
and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert’s
bias.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
Many decision problems are binary in nature and characterized by the uncertainty that the
decision maker faces about crucial decision-relevant facts. Examples include a policy maker’s
decision whether or not to realize a given infrastructure project or to support a struggling
industry, a Board’s decision whether or not to replace a company’s CEO, the voters’ decisions
whether or not to reelect an incumbent government, or a judge’s decision whether or not to
convict a defendant. To reduce uncertainty decision makers often consult experts who are
better informed about the underlying facts. However, experts may themselves have a prefer-
ence over the decision, and this preference may not be well-aligned with the decision maker’s
preference. Examples include industry experts who are interested in receiving public sup-
port,1 CEOs and incumbent governments who want to remain in power and who know more
about their performance and competence than Boards and voters, respectively, and (expert)
witnesses in trials who have private information about the level of fault of the defendant, but
may be biased towards a specific outcome of the trial.
The question of how much information the decision maker can extract from the expert
is of obvious interest and relevance for public policy and the economics of organization. To
answer this and related questions, we study a model that can be sketched as follows. The
underlying state of the world is unknown to the decision maker, but known to the expert.
The decision maker’s preferences are such that she likes to realize a given project if the state
is high, and to reject it if the state is low.2 The expert sends a – possibly biased – report
to the decision maker about the state of the world. His preferences are such that he gets a
benefit, which is independent of the state and referred to as his bias, if and only if the decision
is to realize the project. Further, the expert incurs a cost of lying which increases in the size
of his lie. This cost may be due to reputational concerns or psychological constraints, or may
arise because misreporting is unlawful and may be punished. Both his bias and the cost of
lying are common knowledge, and so are the preferences of the decision maker.
1Defence spending illustrates this: Parliaments lack the technical know-how to assess the needs of the army,
and therefore have to seek the advice of experts from the military-industrial complex who may benefit from
procurement contracts.
2Throughout the paper we refer to the decision maker as “she” and to the expert as “he”.
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Equilibrium behavior depends on the expert’s bias and the decision maker’s prior beliefs
about the state of the world. In particular, three cases need to be distinguished: (i) mod-
erately biased expert, (ii) strongly biased expert when the decision maker’s prior is in favor
of the expert’s preferred decision, and (iii) strongly biased expert when her prior is unfavor-
able. In each case, equilibrium exhibits both separating and pooling segments. Hence some
information is always revealed. In any equilibrium the expert manages to obtain his preferred
decision for some states in which the decision maker would decide differently if she could
observe the state directly. There is also an asymmetry for strongly biased experts: If the
decision maker’s prior is favorable, the expert manages to conceal information that would not
be in his favor, so that the project is realized for all states, while for an unfavorable prior the
expert succeeds in conveying some relevant information that is in his favor.
In terms of comparative statics, increasing lying costs cause moderately biased experts
to misrepresent their information less, but have no effect on the behavior of strongly biased
experts in the presence of a favorable prior (unless the cost increase is so large that the expert
becomes moderately biased). If the expert is strongly biased and the decision maker’s prior
unfavorable, the probability of project realization increases with the costs of lying (unless
the cost increase is so large that the expert becomes moderately biased). The reason is that
in this case equilibrium play by the decision maker involves mixed strategies for the pooling
observation. To keep the expert indifferent, costlier lying has to be rewarded with more
frequent project realization.
As shown in an extension, results do not change when there is some chance that the
decision maker is not fully rational and takes the expert’s report by its face value. The model
also extends naturally to situations with multiple experts with biases of different sizes and to
situations with uncertainty about the size of the expert’s bias. Moreover, we briefly discuss
what happens when the expert has the right to remain silent.
The canonical model to study this sort of strategic interactions between an expert (or
sender) and a decision maker (or receiver) is Crawford and Sobel (1982). We depart from
their framework in two important ways. First, we assume that it is costly for the expert to
misreport the state. Second, the choice variable of the decision maker is binary rather than
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continuous. This second difference implies that there is a conflict of interest between the
expert and the decision maker for low, but not for high states. While in Crawford and Sobel’s
model the expert and the decision maker perpetually disagree about the optimal policy (even
under complete information), their disagreement is only partial in our setup.3
Lying costs were suggested by Crawford and Sobel (1982, p. 1450) and have recently
been introduced into their framework by Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009). The model
of Kartik (2009) is closest to ours. He introduces lying costs, but maintains Crawford and
Sobel’s assumptions that the decision maker’s choice variable is continuous and that the
expert’s preferred action increases in the state of the world. Our analysis thus complements
his with the key modification that the decision maker’s choice variable is discrete and that
the expert’s preferences are state independent and, consequently, aligned with the decision
maker’s preferences for some but not all states.4
Krishna and Morgan (2001) modify the framework of Crawford and Sobel by allowing
for two experts who move sequentially.5 We discuss how our results differ from theirs in the
extension in which we allow for multiple experts.
Our paper further relates to a number of contributions that do not directly build on
Crawford and Sobel (1982): Morris (2001) analyzes political correctness by an expert who
does not want to appear biased. His model is in some sense converse to ours, as there are
two states of the world while the decision maker’s policy space is continuous (and there are
no lying costs). Wrasai and Swank (2007) study expert behavior in a model in which the
expert’s message space is binary and the decision maker is uncertain about the expert’s bias.6
Our framework permits various applications. First, some “experts” may have a vital self-
3Melumad and Shibano (1991) show for the linear-quadratic specification of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model with a somewhat more general bias that ex ante communication needs not yield Pareto improvements
for the sender and receiver. It follows from the extension presented in Section 4.4 that the same is true in our
model when the expert is strongly biased and the prior favorable.
4Edmond (2010) studies a model with a continuum of decision makers who play a coordination game. When
the ‘lying’ costs in his model are linear, his equilibrium structure is similar to ours when the expert’s bias is
moderate.
5Cummins and Nyman (2005) provide a related model of competing experts. There are two experts and
two states, and the experts simultaneously choose binary policies. The decision maker is uncertain about the
state but updates her beliefs after observing the policies. Cummins and Nyman show that in equilibrium no
information may be transmitted from the experts to the decision makers.
6Questions that are similar to ours are also analyzed in the literature on informational lobbying and bu-
reaucracy (see, e.g., Swank et al., 1999, and van Winden, 2004).
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interest that a “project” is continued rather than canceled. For example, CEOs sometimes
have incentives to embellish the financial situation of their company or their track-record to
induce the Board to retain them or to influence a shareholder vote.7 In this respect, our model
complements the existing literature which mainly focuses on CEO’s influencing continuous
outcome variables, such as the market price of the firm (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000), his
compensation (Goldman and Slezak, 2006), or the range of possible projects (Adams and
Ferreira, 2007). For the same reasons, product managers may have incentives to exploit their
information advantage and send biased reports on the profitability of some products to prevent
capital reallocation. Similarly, universal banks face conflicts of interest when their private
banking or brokerage section recommends an Initial Public Offerings that their investment
bank section has recently taken public, or when they promote funds or Structured Investment
Products that are managed by the same bank.8 Analogously, country directors in international
development agencies may have incentives to embellish the reforms in the countries they are
assigned to in order to increase their budget. In a similar vein, scientific experts advising the
World Health Organization on whether or not to recommend that countries stockpile certain
drugs may have incentives to inflate their reports about the severity of the disease if they
have financial ties to the pharmaceutical firms producing these drugs.9
Second, the model applies to incumbent government behavior. For example, it predicts
that an incumbent government who is known to be tough on terrorism may inflate its report
on the threat from future terrorist attacks to improve its reelection prospects. This prediction
is consistent with the allegations that former President George W. Bush may have misused
terror alerts to obtain an electoral edge in the campaign against John Kerry in 2004. Indeed,
by far the longest lasting rise to “high risk” in the Homeland Security Advisory System during
7A recent example is the merger of Bank of America with Merrill Lynch. It has been argued that Bank of
America’s CEO Ken Lewis, who was in favor of the deal, had detailed knowledge that Merrill’s last quarter
losses were going to be over $12 billion, but did not share this crucial information with Bank of America
shareholders when they voted on accepting the merger on December 5, 2008 (cf. The Atlantic Monthly, “An
Offer He Couldn’t Refuse”, September 2009, p. 64/5). According to this interpretation, Lewis traded off
substantial lying costs (the risk of being persecuted for “securities fraud”) with large rents from office.
8Empirical evidence suggests that the bank’s advice is biased in these situations and that investors are
harmed by the information asymmetry (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ber et al., 2001).
9The H1N1 influenza (“swine flu”) is a case in point. Cohen and Carter (2010, p. 1274) document that
“scientists advising the World Health Organization on planning for an influenza pandemic had done paid work
for pharmaceutical firms that stood to gain from the guidance they were preparing.”
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the first term of George W. Bush was issued on August 1, 2004, three days after John Kerry
accepted his presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention, and lasted until
November 10, 2004, eight days after President Bush’s reelection. Many observers argued that
the Bush administration may have been motivated by strategic political considerations, as
voters preferred Bush over Kerry for the fight against terrorism.10
The application of our model to elections complements Banks (1990) and Callander and
Wilkie (2007). While they analyze how two symmetric candidates make costly lies about the
policies they will implement when elected, our model permits a focus on elections that are
asymmetric in that an incumbent with an informational advantage about the state of the
world runs for reelection. This application also relates our model to Rogoff and Sibert (1988)
and Hodler et al. (2010), where an incumbent with private information about his competence
or the state of the world may choose socially inefficient policies to improve his reelection
prospects.
Third, our framework applies to courts, where (expert) witnesses provide – potentially
biased – evidence that influences the binary decision of a judge or jury between “guilty”
or “innocent”. Indeed, “witnesses often have a material interest in the court’s judgment.
The plaintiff and defendant, for example, are interested in the stakes in the dispute, and an
expert has an interest in future employment as a witness” (Cooter and Emons, 2003: p. 259).
Biased (expert) witnesses thus trade off rents from their preferred verdict with lying costs.
For example, as pointed out by Posner (1999), economic experts often have vested interests,
as they are normally hired by one of the process parties. At the same time, they also face
substantial lying costs, such as perjury penalties or the loss of their academic reputation. Our
model complements the existing literature on biased witnesses in courts that either features
binary state spaces (e.g., Cooter and Emons, 2003) or does not include a binary decision
space (e.g., Sanchirico, 2001; Emons and Fluet, 2009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the basic model,
10Conservative Fox News was one of these observers, writing that “the advantage of incumbency were in
full display” when the Bush administration issued this high terror alert (Fox News, “Dems Question Timing
of Terror Alert”, August 4, 2004; see also Financial Times, “Bush administration defends latest warning on
terrorist threat: Americans’ reaction to the government action has been sceptical”, August 4, 2004). Statements
made by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge after his resignation in February 2005 also point out potential
threat exaggerations (USA Today, “Ridge reveals clashes on alerts”, May 10, 2005).
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which is then solved in Section 3. Section 4 presents our extensions, and Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A contains lengthy proofs.
2 The Model
There are two strategic players, the decision maker M and the expert E. M takes the binary
decision whether or not to realize a certain project, but she is uncertain about the costs and
benefits of this project. E is better informed about these costs and benefits, but he personally
benefits if the project is realized.
We assume that the social costs and benefits depend on the state of the world s, where s
is randomly drawn from the distribution F (s) with density f(s) > 0 and support [a, b]. While
F (s) is common knowledge, only E observes s.11 The timing is as follows: First, E observes
s and sends a report x(s) ∈ [a, b]. Second, M observes the report x (but not s) and decides
to realize the project with probability v(x) ∈ [0, 1].12
In the state of the world s, M’s utility is u(1, s) if the project is realized, and u(0, s)
otherwise. Her net utility from realizing the project is W (s) ≡ u(1, s) − u(0, s). We assume
that W (s) is continuous and satisfies W ′(s) > 0 and W (a) < 0 < W (b). Consequently, there
exists a unique threshold s˜ ∈ (a, b) satisfying W (s˜) = 0. If she knew s, M would thus realize
the project if s > s˜, but cancel it if s < s˜. But since she does not know s, she updates her
beliefs µ(s|x) about s after observing x using Bayes’ rule (where possible) before deciding
whether or not to realize the project.
E is biased and gets a rent Φ > 0 if and only if the project is realized. He thus has an
incentive to misreport what he knows about the state of the world. That is, he might want
to report x(s) 6= s. However, it is costly for him to distort his report x. In particular, he has
to bear the distortion costs c = c(d), where d ≡ |x − s| and cd(d) > 0.
13 For simplicity, we
11Assuming that E observes the state s directly eases the exposition. All our results go through even if
E does not observe s, but only a noisy signal of it, provided the state and the signal are affiliated random
variables.
12We allow for M to use mixed strategies. There would be no equilibrium in the model with the strongly
biased expert who faces an unfavorable prior if M could not mix between her binary actions.
13Costly signal distortions are represented by similar cost functions in, e.g., Lacker and Weinberg (1989),
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), Crocker and Morgan (1998), Callander and Wilkie (2007), Kartik et
al. (2007), Kartik (2009), and Emons and Fluet (2009). This simple cost function eases the exposition, but
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assume c(0) = 0. These costs could represent mental or moral costs of lying. However, we
prefer to think of them as reputational costs or expected punishment, i.e., as costs that arise
because in the future M (or some third party) may learn s and punish E, e.g., by reclaiming
some of E’s remuneration, by not employing E in the future, or even by inflicting an additional
penalty. In this scenario, the expected costs c may increase in the distortion d for various
reasons: First, M may later observe s, and the penalty may directly increase in d. Second,
the penalty may be independent of d, but the probability that E is punished may increase in
d.
Therefore, when distorting the report x by d, E’s utility is Φ − c(d) if the project is
realized, and −c(d) otherwise. We distinguish two cases depending on whether or not the
rent Φ exceeds the costs c(b−a) resulting from the largest possible distortion. If Φ ≥ c(b−a),
E is willing to send any report x(s) for any state s if this guarantees that the project is
realized rather than canceled for sure. If Φ ≥ c(b − a), we therefore say that E is strongly
biased. On the other hand, if Φ < c(b− a), E would not be willing to misreport that bluntly.
For example, he would never report x(a) = b or x(b) = a. In this case, we say that E is only
moderately biased. Notice that it depends on both the rent Φ and the cost function c(d)
whether E’s bias is strong or moderate. We will look at the cases of moderately and strongly
biased experts in turn.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and we focus on equilibria that
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). We use the abbreviation PBE to stand
for perfect Bayesian equilibria that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. To be precise, denote by
x(s) and v(x(s)) the action a perfect Bayesian equilibrium prescribes E respectively M to
take after observing s respectively x. Let UE(v, x | s) be the expected payoff to E, conditional
on s, when he plays x and M plays v. Thus, UE(v(x(s)), x(s) | s) is E’s expected equilibrium
payoff given s. Then:
Definition 1 A PBE is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which M’s belief after observing
some xˆ which E does not play in equilibrium, i.e., x(s) 6= xˆ for all s ∈ [a, b], is µ(s|xˆ) = 0 for
our results would also hold for a more general cost function c = c(x, s) satisfying cx(.) > 0 and cs(.) < 0 if
x > s, and cx(.) < 0 and cs(.) > 0 if x < s.
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all s such that UE(1, xˆ | s) < UE(v(x(s)), x(s) | s).
There will typically exist a continuum of PBE with the same equilibrium structure. We
follow Grossman and Perry (1986) and further narrow our focus on Perfect Sequential Equi-
libria (PSE). We adopt the definition of PSE from Ho¨rner and Sahuguet (2007) and adjust it
to our model:14
Definition 2 A PSE is a PBE in which M’s relative likelihood assessment after observing
some xˆ which E does not play in equilibrium satisfies µ(s1|xˆ)µ(s0|xˆ) =
f(s1)
f(s0)
if UE(1, xˆ | si) ≥
UE(v(x(si)), x(si) | si) for i = 0, 1 and
µ(s1|xˆ)
µ(s0|xˆ)
≥ f(s1)f(s0) if UE(1, xˆ | s1) > UE(v(x(s1)), x(s1) |
s1) and UE(1, xˆ | s0) ≥ UE(v(x(s0)), x(s0) | s0).
Notice that the PSE concept agrees with the Intuitive Criterion to put zero probability on
states at which E could not possibly benefit from a deviation, but it adds the requirement
that after receiving an off-equilibrium report xˆ, M should put the same probability on the
possibility that E has deviated at any state s at which the deviation xˆ could potentially be
profitable for him.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now derive the equilibrium behavior, starting by describing some general properties that
E’s report x(s) must satisfy in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, independent of the strength
of his bias. First, E never sends a distorted report x 6= s that leads to v(x) = 0, i.e., to a
cancelation of the project with certainty. Second, E never distorts his report x so much that
c(d) > Φ.15 Hence, he always sends a report x ∈ [s − d, s + d], where d ≡ c−1(Φ) > 0. He
also never distorts his report x more than necessary to ensure the project’s realization, i.e.,
v(x) = 1. It follows from these observations:
14The refinement introduced by Grossmann and Perry (1986) is slightly more involved than our definition
of PSE. However, because of the binary nature of M’s decision, what we define as PSE selects in our model
exactly the same equilibria as Grossmann and Perry’s refinement.
15To simplify the exposition assume that if E is indifferent between various reports x, he chooses the one
that maximizes v(x).
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Lemma 1 If M plays v(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [s − d, s+ d], then E reports x(s) = s. If M plays
v(x) = 1 for some x ∈ [s− d, s+ d], but v(x) = 0 for all other x ∈ [s− d, s+ d], then E sends
the report x(s) with the lowest distortion d necessary to ensure v(x(s)) = 1.
3.1 Moderate Bias
We now confine our attention to the case in which expert E is moderately biased, i.e.,
Φ < c(b− a), (1)
which is equivalent to d < b − a. M knows that a report x is inconsistent with any state
s /∈ [x−d, x+d] and, consequently, that s > s˜ if x > x˜+d ≡ xH , and s < s˜ if x < x˜−d ≡ xL,
where x˜ ≡ s˜. To simplify the exposition, we assume a ≤ sL and b ≥ sH , where sH ≡ xH and
sL ≡ xL, in the remainder of this section.
16 It follows:
Lemma 2 M plays v(x) = 1 for x > xH and v(x) = 0 for x < xL.
We know from Lemma 2 that M plays either v(x) = 0 or v(x) = 1 for any report
x /∈ [xL, xH ]. Assume for the moment that v(x) ∈ {0, 1} also holds for any x ∈ [xL, xH ].
(Proposition 1 will confirm that with a moderately biased E this holds in any PBE.) Further,
denote by x∗ the lowest x for which M plays v(x) = 1, which satisfies x∗ ∈ [xL, xH ], and let
s∗ ≡ x∗. Lemmas 1 and 2 then imply:
Corollary 1 E reports x(s) = x∗ for s ∈ [s∗ − d, s∗] and x(s) = s for s < s∗ − d.
This corollary describes E’s best reply for all s ≤ s∗ to M’s playing v(x) = 0 for x < x∗
and v(x∗) = 1. In particular, E’s strategy is separating for low states s < s∗− d, but involves
pooling for intermediate states s ∈ [s∗ − d, s∗].
Given Corollary 1, M is uncertain about the true state s when observing x∗. Assume
for the moment that E plays x(s) > x∗ for all s > s∗. (Again Proposition 1 will confirm
16These assumptions play no role in Section 3.2. For our results in Section 3.1 to hold, it would be sufficient
to assume a ≤ s′−d and b ≥ s′, where s′ is defined below and where s′−d > sL and s
′ < sH . If a > s
′
−d, the
equilibrium would be similar to the one in the first part of Section 3.2 despite the expert being only moderately
biased; and if b < s′, the equilibrium would be similar to the one in the second part of Section 3.2.
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that this holds in any PBE with a moderately biased E.) E then knows that the report x∗
is consistent with the continuum of states s ∈ [s∗ − d, s∗]. Her updated belief, using Bayes’
rule, is thus µ(s|x∗) = f(s)
F (s∗)−F (s∗−d)
for s ∈ [s∗−d, s∗] and µ(s|x∗) = 0 for any other s, where
F (y) ≡
∫ y
a f(s)ds. Consequently, her expected net utility from realizing the project is
Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) =
1
F (s∗)− F (s∗ − d)
∫ s∗
s∗−d
W (s)f(s)ds, (2)
which increases in s∗ as Ws(s) > 0. Since x
∗ = s∗, Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) must increase in x∗ as well.
Define s′ by
∫ s′
s′−dW (s)f(s)ds = 0 and let x
′ ≡ s′. Note that s′ ∈ (s˜, sH) and, consequently,
s′− d ∈ (sL, s˜). The definition of x
′ and the fact that Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) increases in x∗ imply that
realizing the project when observing x∗, and inferring that s ∈ [s∗ − d, s∗], maximizes M’s
expected utility if and only if x∗ ≥ x′. This leads to our first main result:
Proposition 1 There exists a continuum of PBE with the same structure, and no other PBE.
Each PBE is characterized by a x∗ ∈ [x′, xH ] such that E sends a distorted report x(s) = x
∗
if s ∈ [s∗ − d, s∗), and an undistorted report x(s) = s otherwise; M plays v(x) = 1 if x ≥ x∗,
and v(x) = 0 for any other x on the equilibrium path. On the equilibrium path, v(x(s)) = 1
for s ≥ s∗ − d, and v(x(s)) = 0 otherwise. For all x off the equilibrium path, v(x) must be
sufficiently small (e.g., v(x) = 0).
The unique PSE corresponds to the PBE with x∗ = x′ and v(x) = 0 for all x off the
equilibrium path.
Figure 1 illustrates the PSE described in Proposition 1. Thick lines depict E’s equilibrium
reporting strategy x(s). M’s equilibrium strategy v(x) is shown along the vertical axis. The
figure illustrates why E has no incentive to deviate at any s. If s < s′ − d, he cannot change
M’s decision to his benefit with a distortion d ≤ d; and if s ≥ s′ − d, he cannot ensure the
project’s realization with any lower d. M can easily infer s for x < x′ − d and x > x′. Her
decision is then the same as she would take if she could observe s herself. After observing x′
M is by definition of x′ as well off when realizing the project as when canceling it (while in
any other PBE she would be strictly better off realizing the project after making the pooling
observation x∗ > x′). For off equilibrium observations x ∈ [x′ − d, x′), the PSE concept
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Figure 1: The PBE Structure with Moderate Bias
requires M to cancel the project with probability one, as such deviations could potentially
benefit E at a continuum of states starting below s′ − d and ending below s′.
Proposition 1 implies that in any PBE the project is realized for all states s ≥ s∗ − d
while it would only be realized for the states s ≥ s˜ if M could observe state s herself. Since
s∗− d < s˜ if s∗ < sH , the project is realized for more states than with symmetric information
in the whole continuum of PBE, except at the endpoint when s∗ = sH and x
∗ = xH . With ex
ante probability F (s˜)− F (s∗ − d) ≥ 0, the project is thus only realized due to E’s possibility
to distort his report x(s) while it would not be realized if the report were sent by an equally
well informed, but unbiased expert, or, equivalently, if M could directly observe the state
s. When observing x∗ and realizing the project, M is aware that she would be better off
canceling the project with probability F (s˜)−F (s
∗−d)
F (s∗)−F (s∗−d)
≥ 0. But she does not do so because the
state s may have been high indeed, as E also reports x(s) = x∗ for s ∈ [s˜, s∗], and because
he manipulates her beliefs about s in such a way that she is weakly better off realizing the
project. Proposition 1 further shows that the unique PSE is the PBE which is best for E, as
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it leads to the realization of the project for all s ≥ s′ − d. When observing x = x′, M realizes
the project in this unique PSE with probability one even though she is indifferent and we did
not impose any tie-breaking restriction on her strategy.
We next study how changes in E’s bias and his lying costs affects our results. A higher
rent Φ leads to an increase in d but a decrease in s′ − d, such that the ex ante probability
that the project is realized increases (assuming that condition (1) still holds). Higher lying
costs c(d) have the opposite effect: they lower d and the ex ante probability that the project
is realized. A tougher punishment for misreporting state s, which increases the costs c(d),
therefore makes E worse off, but M better off. These comparative static results are in line
with much of the economic literature on crime and punishment following Becker (1968).
3.2 Strong Bias
We now focus on the case in which expert E is strongly biased, i.e.,
Φ ≥ c(b− a) (3)
or, equivalently, d ≥ b− a. In this case, E is willing to make any distortion necessary to get
a project realized for sure that would be cancelled for sure if he reported truthfully. A priori,
it may thus seem as if decision maker M should not pay any attention to E’s report x. In this
case, E would however truthfully report x(s) = s for all s. But if E reports x(s) = s for all s,
M would want to pay close attention to x.
We start by describing some general properties that any PBE must satisfy when E is
strongly biased. If M plays v(x) = 1 for some x ∈ [a, b], then E would never send a report
x(s) for any s that leads to v(x(s)) = 0. Therefore:
Lemma 3 There is no PBE in which E’s reporting strategy x(s) is fully separating.
Consequently, there must again exist a pooling range, i.e., a range of states s for which
E sends the same report x(s). However, in contrast to the case when E is only moderately
biased, the equilibrium structure depends now crucially on how M would decide in the absence
of any information about s. We know that M would realize the project in this case if and
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only if ∫ b
a
W (s)f(s)ds ≥ 0. (4)
We say that M’s prior is favorable (for the project’s realization and, hence, for E) if condition
(4) holds, and unfavorable otherwise. Below we derive the PBE and PSE when E is strongly
biased and M’s prior favorable or unfavorable, respectively.
Strong Bias and Favorable Prior
We define the threshold s′′ by ∫ s′′
a
W (s)f(s)ds = 0, (5)
and x′′ ≡ s′′. M is indifferent between realizing or canceling the project when getting a report
x that E sends for all s ≤ s′′, but strictly prefers to realize the project when getting a report
x that E sends for all s ≤ s∗∗, where s∗∗ is an arbitrary state greater than s′′. Observe that
s′′ > s˜. Thus, M also realizes the project when getting a report x that E only sends for some
s > s′′.
Proposition 2 There exists a continuum of PBE with the same structure, and no other PBE.
Each PBE is characterized by a x∗∗ ≥ x′′ such that E sends a distorted report x(s) = x∗∗
for all s < s∗∗, and x(s) = s for all s ≥ s∗∗; and M plays v(s) = 1 for all x ≥ x∗∗. On the
equilibrium path, v(x(s)) = 1 for all s. For all x off the equilibrium path, v(x) is sufficiently
small.
The unique PSE corresponds to the PBE with x∗∗ = x′′ and v(x) = 0 for all x off the
equilibrium path.
According to Proposition 2, the project is always realized if E is strongly biased and M’s
prior is favorable. The reason is that E again misreports states around s˜ (in states s ∈ [a, s∗∗)
to be precise) in such a way that M (weakly) prefers to realize the project when observing
the report x∗∗ even though she is aware that an unbiased expert would advice against the
project’s realization with probability F (s˜)F (s∗∗) .
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Figure 2: PSE with a Strong Bias and a Favorable Prior
Figure 2 illustrates the unique PSE. This is the PBE in which E distorts his reports x(s)
least. That is, E cannot only ensure the project’s realization, but he can do so without
distorting his report x by more than x′′ − a even though he would be willing to distort his
report much more. In fact, he distorts his report x(s) so little that M is again indifferent
between realizing or canceling the project when observing the report x′′ which E sends for
a whole range of states s. M’s equilibrium strategy is however to realize the project when
observing x′′. The unique PSE is thus again the PBE that is best for E.
It is interesting to note that changes in the rent Φ and the distortion costs c(d) have no
effect on the equilibrium behavior as long as condition (3) still holds. Assuming that costs
c(d) are deadweight loss, M’s utility is not affected by small changes in the costs, while E is
strictly better off with lower costs. Welfare maximization would thus require reducing these
costs, e.g., by reducing punishment, at least if they cannot be made sufficiently high that
condition (3) no longer holds.
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As discussed in the introduction, our model differs from Crawford and Sobel’s (1982)
in two respects: First, the sender E’s talk is not cheap but costly if he lies. Second, the
receiver M’s decision is binary rather than continuous. Letting Φ → ∞, lying costs c(d)
become negligible relative to Φ, and our model approaches a model with cheap talk and a
binary decision of the receiver. If M’s prior is favorable, it follows from the above that E’s
equilibrium reporting is the same for any Φ ≥ c(b− a) and that M always realizes the project
even in the cheap talk limit of our game.
Strong Bias and Unfavorable Prior
We now analyze the case in which E is strongly biased and M’s prior is unfavorable, i.e.,
in which condition (3) holds but condition (4) does not. For that purpose, we define the
threshold s′′′ by ∫ b
s′′′
W (s)f(s)ds = 0, (6)
and x′′′ ≡ s′′′. M is indifferent between realizing or canceling the project when getting a
report x that E sends for all s ≥ s′′′. Because s′′′ < s˜ holds, M cancels the project when
getting a report x that E only sends for some s < s′′′.
Proposition 3 There exists a continuum of PBE with the same structure, and no other PBE.
Each PBE is characterized by a x∗∗∗ ∈ [x′′′, b] such that E sends a distorted report x(s) = x∗∗∗
for all s ≥ s′′′, and x(s) = s for all s < s′′′; and M plays v(x) = θ ≡ c(x
∗∗∗−s′′′)
Φ < 1 for
x = x∗∗∗, and v(x) = 0 for x < x′′′. On the equilibrium path v(x(s)) = 0 for s < s′′′ and
v(x(s)) = θ otherwise. For all x off the equilibrium path, v(x) is sufficiently small.
There exists a PSE that corresponds to the PBE with x∗∗∗ = b and v(x) = 0 for all x off
the equilibrium path.
Proposition 3 implies that the project will be realized with strictly positive probability
even if M’s prior is unfavorable and despite the fact that M knows that E is willing to
distort his report x severely. Note that because M mixes in equilibrium for all states s ≥ s′′′
and because s′′′ < s˜, it is ambiguous whether the project is realized with a larger ex ante
probability than if M could observe s herself. Since θ is increasing in x∗∗∗, the PSE with
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Figure 3: PSE with a Strong Bias and an Unfavorable Prior
x∗∗∗ = b is the PBE associated with the highest probability θ that the project is realized
when the state is s ≥ s′′′.17 Figure 3 provides an illustration.
It is interesting to contrast Propositions 2 and 3. If E is strongly biased and the prior is
favorable, his equilibrium reporting strategy x(s) is such that the project is always realized for
any state s; but if he is strongly biased and the prior is unfavorable, his equilibrium reporting
is such that the project is not always canceled. Therefore, E cannot only manipulate M’s
decision to his own advantage if he is known to be moderately biased, but even if he is known
to be strongly biased and willing to severely misreport the true state of the world.
Observe also that E’s equilibrium behavior is independent of his rent Φ and his lying costs
c(d) if he is strongly biased and if M’s prior is unfavorable. The probability θ that M realizes
the project when observing x∗∗∗, i.e., when s ≥ s′′′, however decreases in Φ and increases in
17Other PSE may exist. It follows from Proposition 3 that these PSE would have a very similar structure,
but involve pooling at lower x. After the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A we briefly explain why we
cannot determine in general whether or not other PSE exist in this model with strong bias and an unfavorable
prior.
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c(x∗∗∗ − s′′′). A tougher punishment for misreporting states thus harms E by increasing his
expected lying costs c(d), but it also has the consequence of increasing the ex ante probability
that the project is realized.
Finally, consider again the cheap talk limit of our game. It follows from above that
θ → 0 as Φ→∞. Hence, as talk becomes arbitrary cheap relative to Φ, no decision relevant
information can be transmitted in equilibrium and M does not realize the project, i.e., she
acts as if E had not even sent a report.
4 Extensions
In this section, we discuss four extensions of our model.18 While confirming the general
pattern discussed in the previous section, these extensions also provide genuinely new insights.
4.1 Naive Decision Maker
An interesting question is to what extent the results derived so far are robust when the
decision maker may not be perfectly rational in the sense that she may not fully understand
the model in which she acts. This question is relevant as there are many instances in which
experts cannot be sure whether the decision maker is savvy and, despite being incompletely
informed, understands the model, or whether she is naive and will take his report by its face
value. To capture this we extend our model and assume that M can be of two types. With
probability γ ∈ [0, 1) she is naive and interprets any report x as truthful, therefore realizing
the project if and only if x ≥ x˜.19 With probability 1−γ, M is the sophisticated type studied
hitherto. These types and the probability γ are common knowledge. To guarantee a single
crossing condition, we now also assume c(d) to be weakly convex.
This extended model leads to the following insights: First, the results derived in Section 3
are robust insofar as in each case (moderate bias, strong bias and favorable prior, and strong
bias and unfavorable prior) there exists a unique threshold γˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that for γ ≤ γˆ the
PSE described in Propositions 1-3 are still PSE.
18Appendix B (not intended for publication) contains the corresponding derivations, propositions and proofs.
19With γ = 1, E would simply report x(s) = x˜ for s ∈ (s˜− d, s˜] and x(s) = s for all other s.
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Second, for γ ≥ γˆ there exists a PSE with two pooling ranges. In relatively low states
s, E sends the pooling report x˜, which is aimed at the naive type of M and hence gets the
project realized with probability γ. In higher states s, E sends the pooling report x2 > x˜,
which makes the sophisticated type of M indifferent. For all other s (if such s exist), E sends
a truthful report. When E is moderately biased, or when he is strongly biased and M’s prior
favorable, the project is always realized upon observations x ≥ x2.
20
Third, the possibility that she may be thought of as naive can improve the welfare of the
sophisticated type of M. In particular, when E’s bias is strong and M’s prior is favorable, the
sophisticated type of M is strictly better off when γ > γˆ than when γ < γˆ. The main reason
is that the pooling report x˜ reveals very low states z when γ > γˆ, so that she can make an
informed decision in these states, whereas she always realizes the project when γ < γˆ.
4.2 Multiple Like Biased Experts
In some relevant instances an expert enjoys a natural monopoly, e.g., if he is the informed head
of an organization. In other important applications, however, there are naturally multiple
experts who may differ with respect to the strength of their biases. In the jargon of Krishna
and Morgan (2001), these experts are thus “like biased”. For example, when a decision maker
decides on a big public infrastructure project, typically several industry experts are consulted
who may all benefit from the “project” being realized, but to different extents.
To account for that, consider N ≥ 2 experts who may differ with respect to their biases
Φi > 0, where i = 1, ..., N . Without loss of generality we label experts in increasing order of
their biases, i.e., Φ1 ≤ ... ≤ ΦN . These biases are common knowledge, and all experts have
the same costs of lying c(d) and observe state s.
When all experts submit their reports simultaneously there exists a PSE in which each
expert reports as if he were the only expert and his bias were Φ1, and M decides as she would
if there were only one expert whose bias was Φ1. There also exists a fully separating PSE in
which each expert reports truthfully simply because if every one else is saying the truth no
20In these two cases, the two PSE exist under mutually exclusive conditions. With a strong bias and an
unfavorable prior, the sophisticated type of M may play a mixed strategy upon making the pooling observation
x2.
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expert can gain by unilaterally deviating. There are no other PSE.
Now consider as in Krishna and Morgan (2001) a setting where experts report sequentially
and in an arbitrary order, and where every expert can observe the reports of his predecessors.
In this case the first equilibrium of the simultaneous reporting case still persists, but the fully
separating PSE ceases to exist, and there are no other PSE.
These findings are in line with the results of the basic model. The implication that the
decision maker fares as well with N experts as with a single expert if the single expert is the
one with the smallest bias is consistent with Krishna and Morgan’s (2001) finding that the
most informative equilibrium with two like biased experts is never more informative than the
most informative equilibrium with a single expert. However, there is a subtle, but important
difference between our result and theirs: In Krishna and Morgan’s cheap talk model the
decision maker may be worse off with two experts than with a single expert, whereas having
more experts can never make her worse off in our model. Quite to the contrary, ever more
information gets transmitted in equilibrium as the number of experts rises if having more
experts means that the minimal bias of all experts decreases.
4.3 Uncertain Size of Expert’s Bias
Decision makers often face some uncertainty about how biased the expert is. Therefore
consider a single expert E whose bias Φ is not known by M. For simplicity, assume that Φ
can be of two types only. It is common knowledge that Φ takes the value Φ1 with probability
α and the value Φ2 with probability (1−α) where 0 < Φ1 < Φ2. Call an expert with bias Φ1
(Φ2) weakly (strongly) biased.
The general structure of the PSE of the basic model remains the same under uncertainty
about the bias in the following sense: If both (or all) types are strongly biased and the prior
is favorable, the PSE strategies of all types are identical to the equilibrium strategy of the
single, strongly biased expert of the basic model. Also for strong bias and unfavorable prior
and for moderate bias the structure of the basic model with pooling and separating segments
remains the same. The only difference is that now the thresholds at the beginning and end of
the pooling segments are different. In particular, type 1 gets the project passed less frequently
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than if M knew his bias, while type 2 gets the project passed more frequently. Consequently,
the expert tends to benefit if his bias is underestimated, but to be worse off if his bias is
overestimated.
4.4 The Right to Remain Silent
There exist both situations in which experts are obliged to send a report, and situations in
which they have the choice to withhold a report, i.e., to say “no comment”. While we have
so far focused on the former situations, we now briefly discuss the latter. Consider again a
single expert with known bias. Clearly, E has incentives to avoid lying costs. Thus, whenever
M’s prior is favorable (both for moderate and for strong bias), there is an equilibrium where
E never sends a report and M realizes the project for sure. There are also other equilibria
in which E sends a truthful report x(s) = s for some but not all s. In all of these equilibria,
though, the project is realized for all s.
If the bias is moderate and the prior unfavorable, E is indifferent between sending x(s) = s
and sending no report whenever s < s′−d (where v(x) = 0 in both cases), while for s ≥ s′−d
he sends the same report and M selects the same actions as in Proposition 1. If E’s bias is
strong and the prior unfavorable, E is indifferent between sending x(s) = s and sending no
report whenever s < s′′′ (where v(x) = 0 in both cases), while for s ≥ s′′′ he sends the same
report and M selects the same actions as in Proposition 3. Hence, in contrast to the case with
a favorable prior, it cannot occur that E remains silent for all s when M’s prior is unfavorable.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the behavior of biased experts in a setting with a continuous state space and
a binary choice of the decision maker. Further, in our model lying entails some cost that is
increasing in the extent of distortion. This framework is suitable to analyze various real-world
problems such as expert advice and testimony related to public policies or to court decisions,
CEO and manager behavior given binary Board or investor decisions, as well as incumbent
government behavior before reelections.
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We show that three kinds of biased experts can be distinguished according to equilibrium
play: Moderately biased, strongly biased with favorable prior of the decision maker, and
strongly biased with unfavorable prior of the decision maker. Interestingly, in equilibrium in
all three cases the strategy of the expert includes separating and pooling segments. Further,
in all three cases the fact that the expert has private information about the state of the world
and is able to send a report to the decision maker increases the set of parameter values for
which the decision maker may realize the project. In extensions we show that these results
also hold when the decision maker may be naive, when there are multiple like biased experts,
when the decision maker faces some uncertainty about the size of a single expert’s bias, and
when the expert has the possibility to remain silent.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We proceed as follows: First we show that the strategy profile
and the associated beliefs constitute PBE. Second we prove that no other PBE exist. Third
we show that any PBE with x∗ > x′ is not a PSE. Fourth we show that the PBE with x∗ = x′
is a PSE.
It follows from Lemma 1 that E’s strategy is optimal given M’s strategy. M’s strategy is
optimal if and only if her beliefs are such that Eµ(W (s)|x) ≤ 0 for x < x
∗ and Eµ(W (s)|x) ≥ 0
for x ≥ x∗. It remains to be shown that M’s beliefs on equilibrium are updated according to
Bayes’ rule and consistent with E’s strategy, and that her beliefs off equilibrium satisfy the
Intuitive Criterion. Since M’s beliefs must be µ(s|x) = 1 for s = x if x < x∗ − d or x > x∗,
it follows that Eµ(W (s)|x) < 0 for x < x
∗ − d ≤ x˜ and Eµ(W (s)|x) > 0 for x > x
∗ > x˜.
Lemma 1, equation (2) and the definition of x′ further imply that M’s beliefs are such that
Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) ≥ 0 since x∗ ≥ x′. Thus, given E’s strategy, M has correct and consistent
beliefs on equilibrium. M’s beliefs off equilibrium must be such that Eµ(W (s)|x) ≤ 0 for
x ∈ [x∗−d, x∗). Note that if s = s∗−d ≤ s˜, E would be better off by playing any xˆ ∈ [x∗−d, x∗)
when followed by v(xˆ) = 1 than by playing his equilibrium strategy x(s) = x∗. Off equilibrium
beliefs µ(s|xˆ) that imply Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) ≤ 0 are thus consistent with the Intuitive Criterion.
We now prove that no other PBE exist in which v(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all x. First, note that
there can be no PBE with the structure described in Corollary 1 and with x∗ < x′. To see
this, suppose to the contrary that x∗ < x′. Corollary 1 then requires M to play v(x∗) = 1, but
the definition of x′ implies Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) < 0. Therefore, M would want to deviate and play
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v(x∗) = 0. Second, note that there can be no PBE in which v(xˆ) = 0 for any xˆ > x∗ given
x∗ ≥ x′. It follows from the definition of x′ and Lemma 1 that if x(s) = xˆ is played for some
s, then Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) > 0 must hold and, hence, v(xˆ) = 1. If E does not play x(s) = xˆ > x
∗
for any s, then M’s off-equilibrium beliefs must satisfy Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) ≤ 0 to sustain a PBE in
which v(xˆ) = 0. However E would be strictly worse off by playing x(s) = xˆ (rather than
his equilibrium strategy) for all s < s∗ and, hence, for all s ≤ s˜, independently of v(xˆ),
but better off by playing x(s) = xˆ for some s > s∗, e.g., s = sˆ ≡ xˆ, if M played v(xˆ) = 1
(rather than v(xˆ) = 0). The Intuitive Criterion thus requires that when observing xˆ > x∗, M
should put zero probability on the possibility that E has deviated at any s ≤ s˜. Hence, her
off-equilibrium beliefs must be such that Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) > 0. Thus, there cannot exist any PBE
in which M plays v(xˆ) = 0 for some xˆ > x∗. As a consequence, E plays x(s) = s for all s ≥ s∗
in any PBE.
We next prove that no PBE exists in which v(x) ∈ (0, 1) for some x on the equilibrium
path, i.e., in which M plays a non-degenerate mixed strategy for some x on equilibrium. M
would only be willing to play v(xˆ) ∈ (0, 1) for some xˆ if Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) = 0. If x(s) = s for
all s and v(x(s˜)) < 1, then E would deviate at s = s˜ to play x(s˜ + ǫ), where ǫ is arbitrarily
small. Hence, whenever v(xˆ) ∈ (0, 1) for some xˆ, then it must hold that x(s) = xˆ for a range
of states s ∈ [sa, sb] satisfying Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) = 0, which requires sa < s˜ < sb. This cannot be
part of a PBE if x(s) = s for s ∈ (sb, sc] for any sc ∈ (sb, b] because E would want to deviate
if s = sb (or if s were slightly below sb) in order to ensure v(x(s)) = 1. Hence, it only remains
to be shown that there cannot be a PBE with x(s) = xˆ for s ∈ [sa, sb] and x(s) = ˆˆx > xˆ for
s ∈ (sb, sc]. [For this to be a PBE, it would have to hold that v(ˆˆx) = 1 (since sb > s˜) and
that Φ− c(|ˆˆx− sb|) = v(xˆ)Φ − c(|xˆ − sb|)]. There cannot exist such a PBE with ˆˆx < xc ≡ sc
because E could only benefit from deviating and playing some x ∈ (ˆˆx, xc] for some s > ˆˆs > s˜,
where ˆˆs ≡ ˆˆx. The Intuitive Criterion would thus require M to believe µ(s|x) = 0 for all s ≤ s˜,
and E would thus want to deviate at s ∈ (ˆˆs, sc]. There also cannot exist such a PBE with
ˆˆx ≥ xc because E could only benefit from deviating and playing some x = ˆˆx − ǫ, where ǫ is
positive but can be arbitrarily small, if s ∈ [sb − ǫ˜, ˆˆs − ǫ/2], where ǫ˜ is small as well. The
Intuitive Criterion would thus require M to believe µ(s|x) = 0 for all s ≤ s˜, and E would thus
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want to deviate at s ∈ [sb − ǫ˜, ˆˆs − ǫ/2]. This completes the proof that no equilibrium exists
in which M plays a non-degenerate mixed strategy for some x on equilibrium.
We now prove that any PBE with x∗ > x′ is not a PSE. Consider a deviation xˆ = x∗ − ǫ,
where ǫ is positive but can be arbitrarily small. We first need to identify the states in which
E could have potentially benefitted from the deviation xˆ. The interval (s∗ − ǫ− d, s∗ − ǫ/2)
contains all the states for which E would be strictly better off by the deviation xˆ when followed
by v(xˆ) = 1 than by playing his equilibrium strategy. Second, Bayesian updating by M under
the conditions in Definitions 1 and 2 leads to
EPSEµ (W (s)|xˆ) ≡
1
F (s∗ − ǫ/2)− F (s∗ − ǫ− d)
∫ s∗−ǫ/2
s∗−ǫ−d
W (s)f(s)ds. (7)
Letting ǫ → 0, we have EPSEµ (W (s)|xˆ) → Eµ(W (s)|x
∗). Now, because Eµ(W (s)|x
∗) > 0 for
x∗ > x′, M optimally plays v(xˆ) = 1 in the continuation game after observing a deviation xˆ
close enough to x∗. But given that M plays v(xˆ) = 1, E has indeed an incentive to deviate at
all states s ∈ (s∗− ǫ− d, s∗− ǫ/2). Consequently, for all PBE with x∗ > x′, there exist states
s and deviations xˆ that are profitable for E when followed by a PBE in the continuation game
in which M updates her beliefs according to Definitions 1 and 2. Thus, these PBE are not
PSE.
We are left to show that the PBE with x∗ = x′ is a PSE. Applying the same arguments
as above, it is straightforward to see that given a deviation xˆ = x′ − ǫ and updating on
behalf of M according to definitions 1 and 2 leads to EPSEµ (W (s)|xˆ) ≡
1
F (s′−ǫ/2)−F (s′−ǫ−d)∫ s′−ǫ/2
s′−ǫ−d
W (s)f(s)ds < 0, where the inequality follows from the definition of s′. Hence, it
will be sequentially rational for M to play v(xˆ) = 0. Given this, the deviation will not be
profitable for E at any state s. Last, for any strictly smaller deviation xˆ, EPSEµ (W (s)|xˆ) must
be negative as well (because s∗ − ǫ− d and s∗ − ǫ, obviously, decrease in ǫ). Hence, the PBE
with x∗ = x′ is a PSE. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show that the strategy profile and the associated beliefs
constitute PBE. We then prove that no other PBE exist.
It is straightforward to see that E’s strategy is optimal given M’s equilibrium strategy,
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and that M’s strategy is optimal given her beliefs µ(s|x) are such that Eµ(W (s)|x) ≥ 0 if
x ≥ x∗∗, and Eµ(W (s)|x) ≤ 0 if x < x
∗∗. It follows from the definition of s′′ and s′′ > s˜
that Eµ(W (s)|x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ x
∗∗ ≥ x′′. M’s beliefs off equilibrium must be such that
Eµ(W (s)|x) ≤ 0 for x < x
∗∗. Note that if s = a, E would be better off by playing any xˆ < x∗∗
when followed by v(xˆ) = 1 than by playing his equilibrium strategy x(a) = x∗. Thus, there
are off equilibrium beliefs µ(s|xˆ) such that Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) ≤ 0 which are consistent with the
Intuitive Criterion.
We start proving that no other PBE exist by noting that in any PBE v(x(s)) = 1 must
hold for some s. Otherwise, it would have to hold for all s > s˜ that x(s) is part of a pooling
range xp and that M’s beliefs µ(s|x) are such that she plays v(xp) < 1. But given the favorable
prior, these two requirements cannot jointly hold. Hence, v(x(s)) = 1 for some s. Together
with Lemma 3, this implies that v(x(s)) = 0, where both v(.) and x(s) are equilibrium
strategies, cannot hold for any s. There must thus be a pooling range with x(s) = xˆ for all
s ∈ [a, s∗∗] where s∗∗ ≥ s′′.
We next show that there are no other PBE with v(x(s)) = 1 for all s. Given that x(s) = xˆ
is optimal for E if and only if s ∈ [a, s∗∗], it must hold that x(s) > xˆ for s > s∗∗. Further, we
can use the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 1 to prove that there are no PBE
in which M plays v(x) < 1 for some x > x∗∗. Hence, it must hold that xˆ = x∗∗ and that
x(s) = s for all s > s∗∗.
We also have to show that there are no PBE in which v(x(s)) ∈ (0, 1) for s ∈ [a, s′′]. (We
know that there cannot exist a PBE with v(x(s)) < 1 for any s > s′′.) We can again do this
using the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 1.
We can also use the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 1 to show that any PBE
with x∗∗ > x′′ is not a PSE, and that the PBE with x∗∗ = x′′ and v(x) = 0 for all x off the
equilibrium path is a PSE. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First we show that the strategy profile and the associated beliefs
constitute PBE. Then we prove that no other PBE exist.
Given M’s equilibrium strategy, with θ ensuring that E is indifferent between x(s) = x∗∗∗
and x(s) = s′′′ if s = s′′′, E’s strategy is optimal. M’s strategy is optimal if her beliefs µ(s|x)
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are such that Eµ(W (s)|x
∗∗∗) = 0 and Eµ(W (s)|x) ≤ 0 for x 6= x
∗∗∗. It follows from the
definition of s′′′ and s′′′ < s˜ that Eµ(W (s)|x
∗∗∗) = 0 and that Eµ(W (s)|x) < 0 for x < x
′′′.
Note that if s = a, E would be better off playing any xˆ ∈ [x′′′, x∗∗∗) or any xˆ > x∗∗∗ when
followed by v(xˆ) = 1 than playing his equilibrium strategy x(a) = a. The Intuitive Criterion
thus allows for off equilibrium beliefs µ(s|xˆ) that imply Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) ≤ 0.
We next prove that it must hold in any PBE that v(x(s)) ∈ (0, 1) for s ≥ s′′′ and
v(x(s)) = 0 otherwise. By an argument symmetric to the one used in the proof of Proposition
2, one can show that in any PBE v(x(s)) = 0 for some s must hold. Together with Lemma
3, this implies that v(x(s)) = 1 cannot hold for any s in any PBE. Therefore, there must
be a pooling range with x(s) = x∗∗∗ for all s ∈ [sˆ, b] with sˆ ≤ s′′′. Lemma 1 further implies
x(s) = s for all s for which v(x(s)) = 0. Therefore, it must hold that sˆ = s′′′ such that
v(x∗∗∗) ∈ (0, 1) is possible. Since s′′′ < s˜, Lemma 1 further implies that x(s) = s and,
hence, v(x(s)) = 0 for all s < s′′′. In any PBE of this structure, v(x∗∗∗) = θ must satisfy
θΦ− c(x∗∗∗ − s′′′) = 0⇔ θ = c(x∗∗∗ − s′′′)/Φ < 1.
For the PBE with x∗∗∗ = b to be a PSE, it must hold that M’s off equilibrium beliefs
µ(s|x) are such that Eµ(W (s)|x) < 0 for any x ∈ [x
′′′, b). Note that E could potentially
benefit from playing any xˆ ∈ [x′′′, b) for all s except possibly some s close to b. Hence, PSE
requires M’s off equilibrium beliefs µ(s|x) indeed to be such that Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) < 0. 
Potentially Non-Unique PSE with Unfavorable Prior: We briefly discuss why the
existence of other PSE cannot be ruled out when the prior is unfavorable and the bias is
strong. For PBE with x∗∗∗ < b to be PSE, it must hold that all (off equilibrium) xˆ ∈ (x∗∗∗, b]
could potentially benefit E for a set of s such that Eµ(W (s)|xˆ) ≤ 0. This holds for xˆ = x
∗∗∗+ǫ
when ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small, as xˆ could then potentially benefit E for all s. Higher xˆ, e.g.,
xˆ = b, could certainly benefit E if s is close to b or if s < s′′′ (since Φ > c(a − b)), but
possibly not if s is slightly above s′′′. Hence, it is unclear whether or not some of the PBE
with x∗∗∗ < b are PSE.
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B Extensions (not for publication)
B.1 Naive Decision Maker
M is naive with probability γ ∈ [0, 1), and sophisticated with probability 1−γ. If she is naive,
she interprets any report x as truthful and realizes the project if and only if x ≥ x˜. All of this
is commonly known by E and by M when she is sophisticated. We further assume c′′(d) ≥ 0.
Proposition B.1 i) In each of the three cases considered in Propositions 1-3, there exists a
unique threshold γˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that for γ ≤ γˆ the PSE described in these Propositions are
still PSE. There cannot exist any other PSE with only one pooling range.
ii) In each of these three cases, there exists a PSE with two pooling ranges when γ ≥ γˆ.
E reports x(s) = x˜ for s ∈ [s0, s1), x(s) = x2 > x˜ for s ∈ [s1, s2], and x(s) = s for all other
s (if such s exist), where a ≤ s0 < s1 < s2 ≤ b and s2 = x2. When x˜ is reported, a naive
M is indifferent and the project is thus realized with probability γ. When x2 is reported, a
sophisticated M is indifferent and the project is realized with probability 1 if E is moderately
biased, or if E is strongly biased and M’s prior favorable, but a sophisticated M may play a
mixed strategy if E is strongly biased and her prior unfavorable.
Sketch of proof: i) To prove existence of the PSE characterized in Propositions 1-3, we
need to show that E does not want to deviate at any s. In case of moderate bias, we need
to ensure that E does not want to deviate and play x(s) = max{x˜, s} at any s < s′. It
follows from c′′(d) ≥ 0 that E does not have an incentive to deviate at any s 6= s′ − d if he
has no incentive to deviate at s = s′ − d. E has no incentive to deviate at s = s′ − d if
Φ − C(d) ≥ γΦ − C(x˜ − (s′ − d)) ⇔ γ ≤ γˆ ≡ Φ+C(x˜−(s
′−d))−C(d)
Φ ∈ (0, 1). Hence the PSE
characterized in Proposition 1 still exists if and only if γ ≤ γˆ.
The proofs for the cases of strong bias are analogous. The value of the threshold γˆ below
which the PSE characterized in Propositions 2 and 3 still exist is however different, because
of the different pooling ranges and the mixed strategy played by E when making the pooling
observation in Proposition 3.
To prove that there cannot exist any other PSE with only one pooling range, note first
that there cannot exist PSE with a unique pooling report other than x′ or x˜, as there would
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always be some s where E could benefit from deviating and playing either x(s) = s, x′ or x˜
instead. Second, consider a situation with a unique pooling report x˜. In such a situation E
would play x(s) = x˜ for s somewhat below s˜ and x(s) = s for s > s˜. The best response of a
sophisticated M is to play v(x) = 0 for x ≤ x˜ and v(x) = 1 for x > x˜. But the best response
of E is then to play some x slightly above x˜ for a whole range of s ≤ s˜. Hence there cannot
exist a PSE with a pooling range where x˜ is reported, but no second pooling range.
ii) In a PSE with two pooling ranges the thresholds s0, s1 and s2 must satisfy three
conditions. One is for a sophisticated M:
∫ s2
s1
W (s)f(s)ds = 0. It implicitly defines s2 as a
function of s1, s2(s1), which satisfies ds2(s1)/ds1 < 0 and s2(s˜) = s˜. Since s1 < s2, it follows
that s1 < s˜ < s2. The other two conditions are for E: First, γΦ − C(x˜ − s0) = 0 if s0 > a,
and γΦ − C(x˜− s0) ≥ 0 if s0 = a. Second, Φ − C(x2 − s1) = γΦ − C(x˜− s1) if s2 < b, and
[γ+ (1− γ)θ]Φ−C(x2− s1) = γΦ−C(x˜− s1) if s2 = b, where θ denotes the probability that
the sophisticated M realizes the project when observing x2. The first of these two conditions
determines s0; the second one s1 and s2(s1). Note that s0 < s1 and that these two conditions
can hold simultaneously if only γ ≥ γˆ.
Moreover, it must hold that E does not have an incentive to deviate and to play x(s) = s
for s ∈ (s˜, s2). It follows from c
′′(d) ≥ 0 and the second condition for E that he is better off
with x(s) = s2 than with x(s) = s at any s ∈ (s1, s2). 
B.2 Multiple Like Biased Experts
Consider N ≥ 2 experts with biases Φi > 0, where i = 1, ..., N , Φ1 ≤ ... ≤ ΦN . Biases are
common knowledge, and each expert i obtains Φi if and only if M realizes the project. All
experts face c(d) and observe s. We first treat simultaneous and then sequential reporting.
Preliminaries M now forms her beliefs about state s and about the expected net utility
W (s) of the project after observing a set of N reports {x1, ..., xN}. We thus have to specify
what M believes when observing a set of reports that she should not observe in equilibrium.
Following the logic of Nash equilibrium, we thereby focus on unilateral deviations. Given
N ≥ 3, it is easy for M to figure out which expert has unilaterally deviated. When the
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information from the other N − 1 experts is sufficient to deduce s with certainty, M has no
need to think about the motives of the deviating expert. But when the information from
the other N − 1 experts is not sufficient to derive s with certainty, e.g., because they are
all sending some pooling report xˆ, M takes the information that is possibly provided by the
deviating expert into account as suggested by PSE. Given N = 2 and expert i has sent a
report xi that he should never send in equilibrium, M assumes that this expert has deviated
unilaterally. If both reports are part of the experts’ equilibrium strategies, i.e., if there are
s, s′ ∈ [a, b] such that x1(s) = x1 and x2(s
′) = x2 but with, say, s < s
′, we assume that
M believes with probability one that the expert whose report is associated with the higher
state (x2 in the example) has unilaterally deviated. This is motivated by the incentives to
over-report. When updating her beliefs about s, M decides in the same way for N = 2 as
when N ≥ 3 whether or not to take the report of the deviating expert into account.
Simultaneous Reporting Under simultaneous reporting the results are as follows:21
Proposition B.2 When the multiple like biased experts report simultaneously, there exists a
PSE in which each expert i reports as he would in the (or a) PSE if he were the only expert
and his bias were Φ1, and on equilibrium M decides as she would if there were only one expert
whose bias was Φ1.
There also exists a fully separating PSE in which each expert i reports truthfully xi(s) = s
for all s. There are no other PSE.
Proof: The first part of the statement follows directly from the results of Section 3 that
on equilibrium M’s beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule given the experts’ strategies, and
that given these beliefs her strategy is optimal. It remains to show that no expert i wants
to deviate unilaterally: No i wants to deviate and report any higher xi because for any s
this would increase distortion costs without affecting M’s decision. No i wants to deviate and
report any lower xˆi if xi(s) = s is prescribed because this would also increase distortion costs
without affecting M’s decision. No i wants to deviate and report any lower xi if xi(s) 6= s is
prescribed, i.e., if all experts send the pooling report xp. The reason is that M is indifferent
21As seen earlier, there may be multiple PSE with a single strongly biased expert who faces an unfavorable
prior. Propositions B.2 and B.3 do not preclude such multiplicity.
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when knowing that s ∈ [sp − d1, s
p] (after observing xp), where sp ≡ xp, but that the logic
of PSE requires M to prefer not to realize the project when observing some x < xp, as this
indicates that s < sp.
It is also a PSE that xi(s) = s for all i and s because any unilateral deviation only increases
distortion costs without affecting M’s decision. There cannot be another fully separating
PSE, as each single i could reduce distortion costs without negatively affecting M’s decision
whenever xi(s) < s, but also whenever xi(s) > s and either s < s˜ or xi(s) > xi(s˜). The
proof that there are no further PSE with pooling segments follows from the observation that
no expert i would ever play a pooling strategy xi(s) for some range of s for which another
expert j plays a separating strategy xj(s), as this would only lead to higher distortion costs
without affecting M ’s decision. Hence, if there is a pooling segment, it must be the same
for all experts. The remainder of the proof follows along the lines of the proofs with a single
expert. 
Sequential Reporting Now assume that the experts report sequentially and that every
expert can observe the reports of his predecessors.22 The experts may report in an arbitrary
order with expert 1 moving first, last or anywhere in between. The PSE in which all experts
behave as if they were the only expert and their bias were the smallest bias Φ1 still exists with
sequential reporting. Each expert i knows that expert 1 never lies more than d1, and that M
learns the true s whenever one (or more) expert(s) report truthfully. Hence, no expert i is
willing to lie any more than d1, no matter whether he reports before or after expert 1.
There exists no fully separating PSE. The expert who reports first would have an incentive
to deviate and to report some x ≥ x˜ whenever s ∈ (s˜−d1, s˜), and the other experts would then
have an incentive to follow suit and send the same report as the first expert. To summarize:
Proposition B.3When multiple like biased experts report sequentially, there exists a PSE in
which each expert i reports as he would in the (or a) PSE if he were the only expert and his
bias were Φ1, and on equilibrium M decides as she would if there were only one expert with
bias Φ1. There are no other PSE.
22Without this observability assumption we would be back in the game with simultaneous moves.
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B.3 Uncertain Size of Expert’s Bias
Consider a single expert E with bias Φ unknown to M. It is common knowledge that Φ takes
value Φ1 with probability α and value Φ2 with probability (1−α) with 0 < Φ1 < Φ2. E with
bias Φi is called type i, with i = 1, 2. The timing is such that E first learns his type i and
the state s and then sends a report x. We restrict our attention to cases in which both types
are relatively similar and belong to the same kind of expert, i.e., either Φ2 is small enough to
still qualify as a moderately biased expert in a single expert setup with no uncertainty about
E’s type, or Φ1 is big enough to qualify as a strongly biased expert in such a setup.
Moderate Biases Denote by di ≡ c
−1(Φi) the maximal lie type i is willing to tell. Assume
both types are moderately biased. Let s′i be the cutoff state above which type i gets his
preferred decision when reporting truthfully in the single expert setup without uncertainty
about the expert type. It holds true that s˜ < s′1 < s
′
2, where s˜ is such that W (s˜) = 0. Denote
further by x′i the pooling report sent by i in the PSE of the single non-stochastic expert type
setup. The two types are sufficiently similar so that s′2 − d1 < s˜. Observe that both types
playing their equilibrium strategy of the single expert setup with non-stochastic type is not
part of an equilibrium here because type 2 would have an incentive to send report x′1 for all
s ∈ [s′1 − d2, s
′
1] and x(s) = s otherwise. Define
EUM (α, s0) ≡ α
∫ s0
s0−d1
W (s)f(s)ds
F (s0)− F (s0 − d1)
+ (1− α)
∫ s0
s0−d2
W (s)f(s)ds
F (s0)− F (s0 − d2)
, (8)
and note that EUM increases in s0. Let s
′(α) be such that EUM (α, s
′(α)) = 0.23
Proposition B.4 With uncertainty about the expert’s moderate bias, there exists a unique
PSE. In this equilibrium, type 1 plays x1(s) = s
′(α) for all s ∈ [s′(α)−d1, s
′(α)] and x1(s) = s
otherwise. Type 2 plays x2(s) = s
′(α) for all s ∈ [s′(α)− d2, s
′(α)] and x2(s) = s otherwise.
M plays v(x) = 1 if x ≥ s′(α) and v(x) = 0 otherwise.
Proof: Proofs of existence and uniqueness closely follow along the lines of the proofs of the
23Observe that at s0 = s
′(α) the first term in (8) is positive and the second is negative. Therefore,
∂EUM (α, s
′(α))/∂α > 0 and the implicit function theorem can be invoked to establish ds′(α)/dα < 0. More-
over, s′(1) = s′1 and s
′(0) = s′2.
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model with a single expert with a known bias analyzed in Section 3. 
The above logic extends straightforwardly to a setup with K types, labeled in increasing
order, as long as s′K − d1 < s˜. Proposition B.4 highlights that type 1 (2) gets the project
passed less (more) frequently than if M knew his type, as s′1 < s
′(α) < s′2 for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Strong Biases If both (or all) types are strongly biased, the PSE strategies of all types are
identical to the equilibrium strategy of the single, strongly biased expert of Section 3 if the
prior is favorable. Indeed, the single expert’s equilibrium strategy does not depend on the
exact size of his bias since the point where he starts sending separating (and truthful) reports
is entirely determined by the decision maker’s payoffs.
In contrast, when both types of biases are strong but the prior is unfavorable, a PSE is
slightly more involved, yet still very similar to the one in the model with one expert of known
bias. The thresholds s′′′1 and s
′′′
2 , above which the expert sends the pooling report x1(s) = b,
are in this case type specific. These thresholds satisfy s′′′1 > s
′′′
2 and
EUM (α, s
′′′
1 , s
′′′
2 ) ≡ α
∫ b
s′′′
1
W (s)f(s)ds
1− F (s′′′1 ))
+ (1− α)
∫ b
s′′′
2
W (s)f(s)ds
1− F (s′′′2 )
= 0. (9)
The corresponding PSE can be sketched as follows: Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability
that M realizes the project when observing x = b and assume that type i sends x = b for
s ≥ s′′′i and x = s otherwise. Then θΦ1 = c(b − s
′′′
1 ) and θΦ2 = c(b − s
′′′
2 ) must hold,
implying c(b− s′′′2 )/Φ2 = c(b− s
′′′
1 )/Φ1. Thus, for any given s
′′′
1 there is a unique s
′′′
2 such that
this equality holds and satisfies s′′′2 = b − c
−1
(
Φ2
Φ1
c(b− s′′′1 )
)
≡ δ(s′′′1 ), where δ(s1) increases
continuously in s1 and Φ1, decreases in Φ2 and satisfies δ(s1) < s1 for all s1 < b and δ(b) = b.
Let s′′′(α) be such that EUM (α, s
′′′(α), δ(s′′′(α))) = 0. To ensure that such a s′′′(α) satisfying
s′′′(α) ≤ b and δ(s′′′(α)) ≥ a exists, we assume EUM (α, δ
−1(a), a) ≤ 0. Then, there exists a
PSE in which type 1 plays x1(s) = s for all s < s
′′′
(α) and x1(s) = b otherwise, type 2 plays
x2(s) = s for all s < δ(s
′′′
(α)) and x2(s) = b otherwise, and M plays v(x) = 0 for x < b and
v(b) = θ, where θ = c(b − s
′′′
(α))/Φ1. If EUM (α, δ
−1(a), a) > 0, the PSE is similar except
that type 2 plays x(s) = b for all s.
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Thus, in equilibrium type 1 (2) therefore sends the pooling report x1(s) = b again less
(more) often than if his bias were known.
